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Every day, billions of people use the online social media platform,
Facebook. Facebook requires, as a condition of use, that users "accept" its
terms and conditions-which include a forum selection clause nominating
Calfornia as the exclusive forum for dispute resolution. In Douez v.
Facebook, the Supreme Court of Canada considered whether this forum
selection clause was enforceable, or whether the plaintiff could proceed with
her suit in British Columbia.
The Supreme Court of Canada ultimately decided that the forum selection
clause was not enforceable. It held that the plaintiff had established "strong
cause for departing from the forum selection clause. The Court premised its
decision on two primary considerations: the contract involved a consumer
and was one of adhesion, and the claim involved the vindication of privacy
rights.
The Court's analysis suffers from several major weaknesses that will
undoubtedly cause confusion in this area of law. This Article will examine
those weaknesses, and argue that the Supreme Court of Canada actually
abandoned the strong cause test that it claimed to be applying. The
consequence of the Douez decision is that many forum selection clauses-at
least in the consumer context-will be rendered unenforceable. While this
may be a salutary development from the perspective of consumer protection,
it will undoubtedly have an effect on companies choosing to do business in
Canada.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Emily, a Nova Scotia resident, logs onto Porter Airlines' website,
www.flyporter.com, and sees that fares from Halifax to Boston are advertised
as starting from CAD $150 one way. Emily proceeds to choose the least
expensive ffights, which total $300 roundtrip. On the last booking screen,
however, the price jumped up to $225 each way (for a total of $450 roundtrip)
with a notation that indicated "Price Change." Emily does not notice this
change and proceeds to enter her credit card information and click
"Purchase." She later discovers that she was charged $450 for the transaction.
Unbeknownst to Emily, there is a provision in fine-print on Porter's website
that says "[i]n case of any discrepancy between advertised fares and the fares
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shown on the website at the time of booking, the latter shall prevail."' Emily
wants to sue Porter in Nova Scotia, but is told by a lawyer that by booking
with Porter she has also agreed to the following provision:
You hereby agree and confirm that your use of the Web Site and all of
the communications, transmissions and transactions associated with the
Web Site shall be deemed to have occurred in the Province of Ontario,
Canada and that you irrevocably agree that the courts of the Province
of Ontario, Canada as the proper and most convenient forum concerning
the Web Site, shall have exclusive jurisdiction to settle any and all
disputes arising out of these Terms of Use and you irrevocably submit
and attorn to the jurisdiction of the courts of the Province of Ontario,
Canada. 2
Does Emily have to initiate suit against Porter in Ontario? Or, can she sue
in Nova Scotia, her home jurisdiction? Prior to the Supreme Court of
Canada's decision in Douez v. Facebook, it was likely that a Nova Scotia
court would enforce the forum selection clause and require Emily to pursue
her claim in Ontario. 3 After Douez, the answer is not so clear. Douez has
opened up the possibility that forum selection clauses in consumer contracts
(or at least some consumer contracts) may not be enforceable. If this is the
case, Douez has the potential to cause major upheaval in the law.
In Douez, the Supreme Court of Canada refused to enforce a forum
selection clause in favor of California in an online contract between
Facebook and an individual plaintiff.4 The Court reasoned that public policy
concerns militated against enforcement.5 In particular, the Court focused on
the disparity of bargaining power in the contract and the nature of the rights
at issue to conclude that the forum selection clause was not enforceable. 6 The
Court's analysis suffers from several major weaknesses that have the
potential to wreak havoc in this area of law. This Article will explore in detail
those weaknesses, and argue that the Douez decision actually abandoned the
"strong cause" test that the Court said it was applying. The consequence is
that after Douez, the strong cause test remains in name only-in substance,
the law related to forum selection clauses in consumer contracts has changed
dramatically. While arguably a positive development for consumers, this will
' Special Offers: Terms and Conditions, FLY PORTER, https://www.flyporter.com/en-
ca/special-offers/website-savings [https://perma.cc/RUV8-Q2YM].
2 Terms of Use, FLY PORTER, https://www.flyporter.com/en-ca/terms-of-use [https://
perma.cc/7BL7-PDYT].
3 See Rudder v. Microsoft Corp., 1999 CanLII 14923 (Can. Ont. S.C.J.); Douez v.
Facebook, Inc., 2017 SCC 33 (Can.).
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undoubtedly have ripple effects on companies doing business in Canada.
This Article proceeds as follows: Part II of this Article provides a brief
background on forum selection clauses in common law Canada and discusses
the prevailing "strong cause" test for enforceability. Part III explores the
Douez decision in detail, examining each of the majority, concurring, and
dissenting judgments. Part IV takes a closer look at the Douez decision and
makes the following arguments: a) the Court's use of two separate "public
policy" considerations in Douez is problematic; b) the Court's use of
"secondary factors" to bolster its decision to displace the forum selection
clause is equally problematic; c) the Court failed to consider, much less
balance, the relevant factors under the strong cause analysis; d) the Court did
not hold the plaintiff to her burden of establishing strong cause, and e) the
concurring judgment focusing on public policy and unconscionability
muddies contract law doctrine. Part V makes some global observations about
the shift in the law related to forum selection clauses and what this means for
future cases. Finally, Part VI offers some concluding remarks.
II. A BRIEF BACKGROUND ON FORUM SELECTION CLAUSES IN COMMON
LAW CANADA
A forum selection clause, also known as a jurisdiction clause or choice of
court clause, is a provision that parties put in their contract designating in
advance what court they would like to hear their case in the event of a
dispute.7 Such clauses can be "exclusive" (mandatory) or "non-exclusive"
(permissive).8 An exclusive jurisdiction clause mandates that the dispute be
heard only in the designated forum.9 Thus, an exclusive jurisdiction clause
purports to prevent the assertion of jurisdiction by any court other than that
nominated in the clause. By contrast, a non-exclusive jurisdiction clause
simply confers jurisdiction on the nominated court, but does not preclude the
possibility of the parties suing in a court other than the one named in the
clause. 10
' Forum Selection Clause, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
8 Maxwell J. Wright, Enforcing Forum-Selection Clauses: An Examination of the
Current Disarray of Federal Forum-Selection Clause Jurisprudence and a Proposal for
Judicial Reform, 44 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 1625, 1635 (2011) ("The taxonomy that is generally
employed distinguishes between 'mandatory' and 'permissive' clauses. A mandatory clause
has been described as one that requires any dispute arising under the contract to be brought
only in a specified state or foreign court. Alternatively, a permissive clause has been described
as one that allows a contract dispute to be brought in either a state or federal court located in
the designated forum.").
9 Id.
10 See Mariana Pavlovi6, Contracting Out ofAccess to Justice: Enforcement ofForum-
Selection Clauses in Consumer Contracts, 62 MCGILL L.J. 389, 395 (2016) ("An exclusive
forum-selection clause contains both the positive and negative elements. The clause provides
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An issue arises when a party sues in contravention 1 of an exclusive
jurisdiction clause (hereinafter referred to as a "forum selection clause"). 12
For instance, a forum selection clause might provide that the parties agree to
the exclusive jurisdiction of the courts of Ontario, but the plaintiff sues in
Nova Scotia instead. The Nova Scotia court must decide what the forum
selection clause in favor of Ontario means for its possible assertion of
jurisdiction over the defendant. Historically, forum selection clauses were
thought to "oust" the jurisdiction of courts other than those designated in the
clause. 13 Over time, however, this ouster theory was rejected; instead, the
clause was not regarded as having an effect on the ability of a non-nominated
court to assert jurisdiction over a defendant. 14 Thus, in the above example,
so long as Nova Scotia otherwise had jurisdiction over the defendant, it could
exercise jurisdiction. With that said, courts faced with a forum selection
clause in favor of another jurisdiction would regard the fact that the parties
had chosen another court to adjudicate the dispute as significant in the
jurisdictional calculus. Accordingly, courts would stay their proceedings in
the face of a forum selection clause (even though they had jurisdiction), in
effect requiring a party to sue in the designated forum if they wished to pursue
their claim. 15
that only the nominated court will decide a dispute and 'preclude[s] the parties from seeking
relief in [an]other for[um].' A non-exclusive (permissive) forum-selection clause contains only
the positive obligation. It provides that a nominated court may decide a dispute, but the clause
on its own does not exclude the jurisdiction of other courts.") (footnote omitted).
" It is not possible to sue in contravention of a non-exclusive jurisdiction clause, since a
non-exclusive clause presupposes that other courts may also assert jurisdiction. Where a party
sues in a forum other than that designated in a non-exclusive jurisdiction clause, a Canadian
court will consider the jurisdiction clause as part of a general forum non conveniens analysis.
See id. ("The enforcement of non-exclusive clauses is not subject to a distinct jurisdictional
test; rather, these clauses are considered as one of the factors in the forum non conveniens
analysis by either the nominated or non-nominated court.").
12 Even though it is common to use the expression "exclusive jurisdiction clause," it is
not common to use the expression "exclusive forum selection clause." The use of the term
forum selection clause generally presupposes that the clause is an exclusive one.
'3 MIS Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 9 (1972) ("Forum-selection clauses
have historically not been favored by American courts. Many courts, federal and state, have
declined to enforce such clauses on the ground that they were contrary to public policy, or that
their effect was to oust the jurisdiction of the court.") (citations omitted).
14 In common law provinces, a forum selection clause cannot bind a court or interfere
with a court's jurisdiction. Douez, 2017 SCC 33, at para. 27. ("As the English Court of Appeal
recognized long ago, 'no one by his private stipulation can oust these courts of their
jurisdiction in a matter that properly belongs to them' (The Fehmarn, [1958] 1 All E.R. 333,
at p. 335).").
s For a fulsome discussion of the history of forum selection clauses in Canada, see
Genevieve Saumier & Jeffrey Bagg, Forum Selection Clauses Before Canadian Courts: A
Tale of Two (or Three?) Solitudes, 46 UBC L. REv. 439 (2013).
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The Supreme Court of Canada addressed the issue of the enforceability of
forum selection clauses fifteen years ago in ZI. Pompey v. ECU Line.16
Pompey involved a forum selection clause in a bill of lading providing that
"any claim or dispute arising [under the contract of carriage] . . . shall be
determined by the courts in Antwerp and no other Courts."1 7 The plaintiff
alleged that the defendant was responsible for damage to cargo while in
transit and sued in the Federal Court of Appeal in contravention of the forum
selection clause.18 The case was eventually appealed to the Supreme Court
of Canada.1 9 The Court held that the proper test in deciding whether to
enforce a forum selection clause was the "strong cause" test set out in the
English case, The "Eleftheria. "20 Importantly, the Supreme Court of Canada
in Pompey did not create or endorse a new test for the enforceability of forum
selection clauses. It simply reaffirmed that the strong cause test-which had
already been used for decades to assess forum selection clauses in common
law Canada-continued to apply.21 The test provides:
(1) Where plaintiffs sue in England in breach of an agreement to refer
disputes to a foreign Court, and the defendants apply for a stay, the
English Court, assuming the claim to be otherwise within the
jurisdiction, is not bound to grant a stay but has a discretion whether to
do so or not. (2) The discretion should be exercised by granting a stay
unless strong cause for not doing so is shown. (3) The burden of proving
such strong cause is on the plaintiffs. (4) In exercising its discretion, the
Court should take into account all the circumstances of the particular
case. (5) In particular, but without prejudice to (4), the following
matters, where they arise, may be properly regarded: (a) In what country
the evidence on the issues of fact is situated, or more readily available,
and the effect of that on the relative convenience and expense of trial as
between the English and foreign Courts. (b) Whether the law of the
foreign Court applies and, if so, whether it differs from English law in
any material respects. (c) With what country either party is connected,
and how closely. (d) Whether the defendants genuinely desire trial in
the foreign country, or are only seeking procedural advantages. (e)
Whether the plaintiffs would be prejudiced by having to sue in the
foreign Court because they would (i) be deprived of security for that
claim; (ii) be unable to enforce any judgment obtained; (iii) be faced
with a time-bar not applicable in England; or (iv) for political, racial,
16 Z.I. Pompey Industrie v. ECU-Line N.V., 2003 SCC 27 (Can.).
17 Id. at 455.
18 Id. at 450.
19 Id.
20 Id. at 451.
21 Id.
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religious or other reasons be unlikely to get a fair trial.22
The Supreme Court of Canada observed that there was an overlap between
the factors that are to be taken into account in the strong cause analysis and
those factors that are typically considered by a court in deciding whether to
stay proceedings under the forum non conveniens doctrine. 23 The major
difference, however, lies in the burden of proof. Under the strong cause test,
the "starting point" is that "parties should be held to their bargain, and . . . the
plaintiff has the burden of showing why a stay should not be granted." 24 The
Court noted that the "test rightly imposes the burden on the plaintiff to satisfy
the court that there is good reason it should not be bound by the forum
selection clause" 25 and that "[i]t is essential that courts give full weight to the
desirability of holding contracting parties to their agreements." 26
The Supreme Court emphasized that forum selection clauses "are
generally to be encouraged by the courts as they create certainty and security
in transaction, derivatives of order and fairness, which are critical
components of private international law." 27 The Court did not believe that
there was "reason to consider forum selection clauses to be non-responsibility
clauses in disguise." 28 And, in any event, the strong cause test "provides
sufficient leeway for judges to take improper motives into consideration in
relevant cases and prevent defendants from relying on forum selection
clauses to gain an unfair procedural advantage." 29
Lower courts in common law Canada have largely followed the strong
cause test and routinely stayed proceedings in the face of an otherwise
enforceable forum selection clause.30 Courts have emphasized the
22 Id. at 462. Clearly, the relevant Canadian forum is substituted for the word "England."
23 Id. at 463.
24 Id. at 464.
25 Id. at 463.
26 Id.
27 Id. (citation omitted).
28 Id.
29 Id.
30 See generally Pavlovi6, supra note 10. Professor Pavlovid's analysis reveals that "[t]he
level of the courts' analysis can be grouped into three categories: conflated jurisdictional tests;
application and under-analysis of the strong-cause test; and traditional application of the
strong-cause test." Id. at 410. She further observes that:
The majority of cases, which comprise the third group, applied the strong-cause test and
analyzed the applicable strong-cause factors in light of the 'factual matrix' of the cases.
All five of the factors listed in The Eleftheria-the location of evidence; the applicable
law; the connection between the parties and the forum or the other relevant jurisdiction;
the impact on the defendant and the impact on the plaintiff to sue in the nominated
jurisdiction-have been considered in these cases. More recent cases, which used the
Expedition Helicopters version of the test, considered juridical advantage, public
2018] 183
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importance of holding parties to their bargains, particularly in the commercial
context. For instance, in Expedition Helicopters Inc. v. Honeywell Inc.,31 the
Ontario Court of Appeal took a very strict approach to enforcing forum
selection clauses in commercial contracts:
A forum selection clause in a commercial contract should be given
effect. The factors that may justify departure from that general principle
are few. The few factors that might be considered include the plaintiff
was induced to agree to the clause by fraud or improper inducement or
the contract is otherwise unenforceable, the court in the selected forum
does not accept jurisdiction or otherwise is unable to deal with the
claim, the claim or the circumstances that have arisen are outside of
what was reasonably contemplated by the parties when they agreed to
the clause, the plaintiff can no longer expect a fair trial in the selected
forum due to subsequent events that could not have been reasonably
anticipated, or enforcing the clause in the particular case would frustrate
some clear public policy. Apart from circumstances such as these, a
forum selection clause in a commercial contract should be enforced. 32
Canadian courts have largely treated commercial and consumer contracts
alike in their application of the strong cause test.33 For instance, in Rudder v.
Microsoft Corp.,34 plaintiffs were members of MSN online services and
brought an action in Ontario on behalf of Canada-wide subscribers, alleging
that Microsoft breached its "Member Agreement." 35 The Member
Agreement contained a provision stating that "[t]his Agreement is governed
by the laws of the State of Washington, U.S.A., and you consent to the
exclusive jurisdiction and venue of courts in King County, Washington, in
all disputes arising out of or relating to your use of MSN or your MSN
membership." 36 Relying on this clause, the defendant sought to have the
intended class proceeding permanently stayed, arguing that under this clause,
both parties agreed to the exclusive jurisdiction of Washington. 37 Applying
the strong cause test, the Ontario Superior Court of Justice found that
policy, as well as other relevant factors.
Id. at 411-12.
31 Expedition Helicopters Inc. v. Honeywell Inc., 2010 ONCA 351 (Can.).
32 Id. at para. 24.
33 Pavlovi6, supra note 10; at 406 ("With the exception of four cases, the courts have
applied the existing (commercial) rules as they are, with little regard, if any, to the specific
nature of the consumer transactions or the crucial implications that staying local proceedings
has on consumers' ability to seek and obtain redress.") (footnote omitted).
34 Rudder, 1999 CanLII 14923.
35 Id. at paras. 4-5.
36 Id. at para. 5.
3 See id.
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plaintiffs did not meet their burden and permanently stayed the action.38
Similarly, in Ezer v. Yorktown Securities,39 the plaintiff opened up a
brokerage account with the defendant corporation, agreeing to the following
standard provision: "Any disputes arising between Yorkton and the Client
shall be exclusively within the jurisdiction of the Courts of the Province in
which Yorkton accepts this agreement." 40 The plaintiff subsequently sought
to sue in British Columbia, despite having agreed to sue in Ontario (the
province where the defendant had accepted the agreement). 4 1 The plaintiff
argued that his medical condition prevented him from bringing proceedings
in Ontario, and also noted that there were procedural advantages to bringing
a class action in British Columbia as opposed to Ontario.42 The British
Columbia Supreme Court applied the strong clause test, and ultimately
upheld the forum selection clause in favor of Ontario.43
The Ontario Court of Appeal came to a similar result in Manjos v.
Fridgant," a case involving a forum selection clause in favor of British
Columbia contained in a client account agreement. The plaintiffs had tried
arguing that "the principles set out in Expedition Helicopters should be
modified to recognize that their client account agreements were more in the
nature of consumer contracts, not commercial ones," and that "less weight
should be accorded to a forum selection clause in a consumer contract.' 45
The Ontario Court of Appeal disagreed. The court noted that the individual
plaintiffs were well educated and sophisticated, and that "[a] person who
signs an investment contract acts at his or her own peril if they fail to read
the document before signing it." 46 Accordingly, the Court of Appeal upheld
the lower court's stay of the Ontario action.47
Some courts, however, have struggled to apply the strong cause test in non-
commercial contexts. For instance, in Stubbs v. A TS International B V,48 the
Ontario Court of Appeal "question[ed] whether the 'strong cause' test applies
without modification because the clause in this case arises in an employment
context, rather than a commercial situation where the parties are assumed to
have equal bargaining power." 49 In Friesen v. Norwegian Cruise Lines
38 Id. at paras. 19, 26.
39 Ezer v. Yorkton Securities Inc., 2004 BCSC 487 (Can.).
40 Id. at para. 7.
41 Id. at para. 1.
42 Id. at para. 26.
43 Id. at para. 29.
1 Manjos v. Fridgant, 2016 ONCA 176 (Can.).
45 Id. at para. 5.
4 Id. at para. 8.
47 Id. at para. 12.
48 Stubbs v. ATS International BV, 2010 ONCA 879 (Can.).
49 Id. at para. 58.
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Ltd.,so the British Columbia Supreme Court did apply the strong cause test,
but ultimately concluded that it was satisfied, noting that "if [the court] were
to stay this action in favour of a Florida Court, that would come close to
denying the plaintiff access to a court at all."51 The British Columbia court
was clearly concerned about the forum selection clause in a contract of
adhesion impeding the plaintiffs' access to justice. And, in Microcell
Communications Inc. v Frey, the Court of Appeal for Saskatchewan held that
the plaintiff had, in fact, shown strong cause for departing from a forum
selection clause. 52 The court noted that "[the defendant] seeks procedural
advantages rather than a true resolution of the claim against it. Resolution of
its claim requires participation in a larger class action than one run along
provincial lines. Further, these are contracts of adhesion in essentially a non-
commercial setting." 53
These courts have tapped into the sentiment that perhaps there is
something unique about forum selection clauses in consumer contracts that
warrants treating them differently. In particular, the concern is that these
clauses interfere with a claimant's access to justice by requiring them to
litigate far away from home.54 This effectively shields a company from
liability, since few consumers will go through the hassle and expense of suing
a defendant in the contractually designated forum. Professor Pavlovi6 sums
up the concerns about forum selection clauses in consumer contracts as
follows:
[T]he practical effect is that forum-selection clauses restrict consumers'
access to justice, since the business dictates the choice of court (forum).
The forum chosen by the business is its own home forum or a forum
most favourable to its interests. In a cross-border business-consumer
relationship, the chosen forum is a foreign forum for consumers and it
may often, although not always, offer lesser substantive protection than
a consumer's home forum. On the surface, forum-selection clauses
provide predictability, as consumers know ahead of time which forum
will resolve the dispute. Yet, they significantly restrict consumers'
access to meaningful remedies, since the cost and complexities of
pursuing a claim in a foreign forum often outweigh the financial
benefits of the claim. 55
It is against this backdrop that the Supreme Court of Canada came to decide
the Douez case-a case that squarely placed in issue whether forum selection
50 Friesen v Norwegian Cruise Lines Inc., 2003 BCSC 256 (Can.).
1' Id. at para. 27.
52 Microcell Communications Inc. v Frey, 2011 SKCA 136, at para. 125 (Can.).
5 Id. at para. 119.
54 See Pavlovid, supra note 10, at 393-94.
55 Id.
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clauses in consumer contracts should be treated differently than forum
selection clauses in commercial contracts. 56
III. DOUEZ V. FACEBOOK
A. The Factual Background
In 2011, Facebook launched a new form of advertising, referred to as
"Sponsored Stories." 57 The idea was that if a user "liked" a product,58 the
user's name and photo would be used to promote the product to the Facebook
user's friends.59 Deborah Douez, a resident of British Columbia, launched an
action in 2012 alleging that Facebook's use of her name and picture without
her express consent violated her rights under British Columbia's Privacy Act
("Privacy Act"). 60 Section 3(2) of the Privacy Act makes it:
[A] tort, actionable without proof of damage, for a person to use the
name or portrait of another for the purpose of advertising or promoting
the sale of, or other trading in, property or services, unless that other, or
a person entitled to consent on his or her behalf, consents to the use for
56 Note that the law with respect to forum selection clauses in Qu6bec differs
significantly:
Article 3149 provides for the jurisdiction of Quebec courts in consumer transactions
where the consumer is a resident of Quebec, and effectively prohibits contractual
restrictions on accessing Quebec courts through arbitration or forum-selection clauses.
Additionally, section 11.1 of Quebec's Consumer Protection Act prohibits contractual
restrictions on consumers' "right to go before a court" and has an impact on the
enforcement of arbitration clauses and class action waivers in domestic transactions.
See id. at 394.
* Douez, 2017 SCC 33, at para. 6.
5 On Facebook, the "like" button is a feature which allows users to show positive support
for what other users have posted. "Likes" can be used on items such as photos, videos,
comments, pages, and text posts.
59 The chambers described the practice in the following way:
The plaintiff alleges that Facebook used the names and likenesses of people who were
users of Facebook, without their permission, for advertising. It did so by creating a
product called "Sponsored Stories." Advertisers paid Facebook for Sponsored Stories,
which would feature the name and likeness of Facebook users and the advertising logo
and other product or service information of the entity which had purchased the
advertising service. These Sponsored Stories would be sent to the Facebook users'
contacts, unbeknownst to the Facebook user whose likeness appears in the ad. For
example, a Sponsored Story might go to Deborah Douez's contacts, saying that she
liked a certain product, implying that she endorsed others using or buying the product.
See Douez, 2017 SCC 33, at paras. 6-8.
60 Privacy Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 373 (Can.).
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that purpose. 61
Douez sought to certify a class action on behalf of 1.8 million British
Columbians who allegedly had their names and images appropriated by
Facebook for Sponsored Stories without their consent. 62 Facebook, for its
part, claimed that it obtained users' consent to the practice when the user
agreed to Facebook's Terms of Use. 63
Douez filed suit in British Columbia, despite the following clause in the
Facebook user agreement that required any suits against Facebook to be
brought in the State of California and to be governed by California law:
You will resolve any claim, cause of action or dispute (claim) you have
with us arising out of or relating to this Statement or Facebook
exclusively in a state or federal court located in Santa Clara County.
The laws of the State of California will govern this Statement, as well
as any claim that might arise between you and us, without regard to
conflict of law provisions. You agree to submit to the personal
jurisdiction of the courts located in Santa Clara County, California for
purpose of litigating all such claims. 64
Facebook brought a preliminary motion seeking to stay the action on the basis
of the forum selection clause. 65
B. The Judgments Below
1. Supreme Court of British Columbia (Griffin, J.)
The chambers judge denied Facebook's motion for a stay of proceedings
based on the forum selection clause in Facebook's terms of use. She
concluded that section 4 of the Privacy Act vested exclusive jurisdiction in
British Columbia courts with respect to Privacy Act claims, and that
exclusive jurisdiction could not be overridden by a forum selection clause. 66
Even though her determination on exclusive jurisdiction would have
resolved the issue, the chambers judge also went on to conclude that there
6- Id. at § 3(2).
62 Douez, 2017 SCC 33, at para. 7.
63 Facebook says all people using its service had to register as members and accept its
terms of use as set out in what it now calls a "Statement of Rights and Responsibilities" (the
"Terms of Use"). Facebook claims that through the Terms of Use and other disclosures on its
website, and by users' own actions such as in setting their "privacy settings," it obtained the
express consent of Facebook users to use their names or likenesses in the Sponsored Stories
products. See id. at paras. 120-21.
6 Id. at para. 8. California was (presumably) chosen as the exclusive forum for the
resolution of disputes because Facebook is headquartered in California.
65 Id. at para. 2.
66 See id. at para. 11.
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was strong cause not to enforce the forum selection clause. 67 She was of the
view that enforcing the forum selection clause would absolve Facebook from
liability, because only the British Columbia Supreme Court had jurisdiction
over the matter, i.e., the California court could not hear Privacy Act claims.68
Additionally, she found the purposes behind the Privacy Act, along with
public policy reasons, supported a finding of strong cause for displacing the
forum selection clause.69
2. Court of Appeal for British Columbia (Bauman, C.J. and Lowry and
Goepel, JJ.A.)
The Court of Appeal for British Columbia found that the plaintiff had
failed to show strong cause for why the forum selection clause should be
displaced. 70 Accordingly, the Court of Appeal reversed the decision of the
chambers judge. 71
The Court of Appeal held that the chambers judge had misunderstood the
effect of section 4 of the Privacy Act, and that this misunderstanding tainted
her subsequent analysis. 72 In the Court of Appeal's view, section 4 did not
confer exclusive jurisdiction over Privacy Act claims to British Columbia
courts in general (to the exclusion of other courts).73 Rather, the Court of
Appeal indicated that the section covers subject-matter jurisdiction, not
territorial jurisdiction.74 As such, section 4 conferred jurisdiction on the
Supreme Court of British Columbia to the exclusion of all other courts in
British Columbia.
The Court of Appeal went on to conclude that the plaintiff did not meet
her burden in showing strong cause. The Court explained that the plaintiff
did not provide any reason why the case could not be heard in California.75
The Court clarified that it was not making a determination on California's
territorial competence; rather, the plaintiff simply failed to meet her burden
of showing that California lacked territorial competence. 76 Accordingly, the




7o Id. at para. 15.
71 Id. at para. 13.
72 See id. at para. 14.
n Id.
74 Id.
7 Id. at para. 166 (McLachlin, C.J., dissenting).
6 See id.
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C. The Supreme Court of Canada
The majority of the Supreme Court of Canada held that the British
Columbia action should not be stayed on the basis of the forum selection
clause in favor of California.77 The majority divided, however, on why the
action should proceed in British Columbia. Three judges concluded that the
plaintiff had shown strong cause under Pompey that the forum selection
clause should be displaced. One judge, however, found that the clause was
unenforceable as a matter of contract law. The dissent would have stayed the
proceeding on the grounds that the plaintiff had not shown strong cause for
displacing the forum selection clause.
Prior to examining each of the Supreme Court judgments, it is helpful to
identify areas of agreement in all three judgments. First, all the judges agreed
that section 11 of the Court Jurisdiction and Proceedings Transfer Act
("CJPTA")-the statutory authority for granting a stay of proceedings in the
Douez case-did not purport to codify the test for the enforceability of forum
selection clauses. 78 Section 11 of the CJPTA is the statutory counterpart to
the common law forum non conveniens doctrine and directs courts to
consider a variety of factors in "deciding the question of whether it or a court
outside [the province] is the more appropriate forum in which to hear a
proceeding. .. . "79 The Supreme Court concluded that section 11, which
makes no reference to forum selection clauses, "was never intended to codify
the test for forum selection clauses." 80 The Court held that in the absence of
legislation to the contrary, the common law test from Pompey "continues to
apply and provides the analytical framework" for analyzing the
n Id. at para. 76 (majority opinion). The parties are currently in the process of litigating
what, if any, weight should be given to the Supreme Court of Canada's decision in the separate
motion to certify the action as a class proceeding under the British Columbia Class
Proceedings Act. Class Proceedings Act, R.S.B.C. 1996., c. 50 (Can.); see e.g., Respondent's
Supplemental Factum, Douez v. Facebook, Inc., 2017 SCC 33 (Can.) (No. CA041917);
Appellant's Supplemental Reply Factum, Douez v. Facebook, Inc., 2017 SCC 33 (Can.) (No.
CA041917).
7 Douez, 2017 SCC 33, at para. 20 (majority opinion).
79 Id. at para. 128 (Abella, J., concurring). The factors to be considered include:
(a) the comparative convenience and expense for the parties to the proceeding and for
their witnesses, in litigating in the court or in any alternative forum,
(b) the law to be applied to issues in the proceeding,
(c) the desirability of avoiding multiplicity of legal proceedings,
(d) the desirability of avoiding conflicting decisions in different courts,
(e) the enforcement of an eventual judgment, and
(f) the fair and efficient working of the Canadian legal system as a whole.
Id.
8o Id. at para. 20 (majority opinion).
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enforceability of forum selection clauses.81
Second, all the judges agreed on the relevant test for the enforceability of
forum selection clauses in the consumer context-the strong cause test
affirmed almost fifteen years earlier in Pompey.82 The test is actually a two-
step test.83 At the first step, the party seeking to enforce the forum selection
clause (the defendant) must show that the clause is valid and enforceable as
a matter of contract law. 84 If the clause passes muster under the first step,
then the burden shifts to the party seeking to displace the clause (the plaintiff)
to show strong cause for why the clause should not be enforced.85
Accordingly, all of the judges rejected the plaintiffs contention that the
strong cause test should be abandoned in favor of a more holistic analysis
that simply considers the presence of a forum selection clause as one factor,
among many, to weigh in the forum non conveniens analysis.86
While the Court was unanimous on the legal test to be applied, 87 the judges
1 Id. at para. 22.
82 See id. at paras. 28-29.
83 Id. at para. 28.
84 Id.
8 Id. at para. 29. The majority described the two-part test as follows:
Instead, where no legislation overrides the clause, courts apply a two-step approach to
determine whether to enforce a forum selection clause and stay an action brought
contrary to it. At the first step, the party seeking a stay based on the forum selection
clause must establish that the clause is "valid, clear and enforceable and that it applies
to the cause of action before the court." At this step of the analysis, the court applies
the principles of contract law to determine the validity of the forum selection clause. As
with any contract claim, the plaintiff may resist the enforceability of the contract by
raising defences such as, for example, unconscionability, undue influence, and fraud.
Once the party seeking the stay establishes the validity of the forum selection clause,
the onus shifts to the plaintiff. At this second step of the test, the plaintiff must show
strong reasons why the court should not enforce the forum selection clause and stay the
action. In Pompey, this Court adopted the "strong cause" test from the English court's
decision in The "Eleftheria[]" In exercising its discretion at this step of the analysis, a
court must consider "all the circumstances", including the "convenience of the parties,
fairness between the parties and the interests of justice." Public policy may also be a
relevant factor at this step.
Id. at paras. 28-29 (citations omitted).
86 See, e.g., id. at para. 133 (McLachlin, C.J., dissenting) (rejecting plaintiff's contention
that the Pompey test should be rolled into the forum non conveniens analysis).
87 The dissent adds a bit more nuance to the two-part test:
Where the parties have agreed to a forum selection clause, the court must apply that
clause unless the test in Pompey is satisfied. If the test is satisfied and the forum
selection clause is inapplicable, the result is a situation where there are two competing
possibilities for forum. At this point, the CIPTA which codifies the common law
provisions forforum non conveniens applies.
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strongly disagreed on the application of the test to the facts of the case.
Below, each of the three judgments is examined in turn.
1. The Majority Judgment (Karakatsanis, Wagner and Gascon, JJ.)
The majority acknowledged at the outset that "[f]orum selection clauses
serve a valuable purpose"8 8 in providing "certainty and security in
transaction, derivatives of order and fairness, which are critical components
of private international law." 89 With respect to consumer contracts, however,
the majority believed that the analysis of strong cause must account for the
unique realities of consumer contracting. In this respect, the majority stated:
But commercial and consumer relationships are very different.
Irrespective of the formal validity of the contract, the consumer context
may provide strong reasons not to enforce forum selection clauses. For
example, the unequal bargaining power of the parties and the rights that
a consumer relinquishes under the contract, without any opportunity to
negotiate, may provide compelling reasons for a court to exercise its
discretion to deny a stay of proceedings, depending on the other
circumstances of the case.
.. . Canadian courts have recognized that the test may apply
differently, depending on the contractual context. The English courts
have also recognized that not all forum selection clauses are created
equally.... Similarly, Australian courts have found "that in a consumer
situation [courts] should not place as much weight on an exclusive
jurisdiction clause in determining a stay application as would be placed
on such a clause where there was negotiation between business people."
As these cases recognize, different concerns animate the consumer
context than those that this Court considered in Pompey, where a
sophisticated commercial transaction was at issue. Because of these
concerns, we agree with Ms. Douez and several interveners that the
strong cause test must account for the different considerations relevant
to this context.90
Accordingly, the majority thought that the strong cause test needed to be
modified to account for the consumer context, thereby endorsing an approach
that would "take account of all the circumstances of the particular case,
including public policy considerations relating to the gross inequality of
bargaining power between the parties and the nature of the rights at stake."9 1
Id. at para. 131.
88 Id. at para. 24 (majority opinion).
89 Id.
9 Id. at paras. 33-35 (citations omitted).
9' Id. at para. 38.
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The majority did not spend much time discussing step one of the Pompey
analysis (the enforceability of the forum selection clause as a matter of
contract law). It noted, briefly, that the British Columbia Electronic
Transactions Act ("Electronic Transactions Act") 92 permits offer and
acceptance to occur through electronic means, e.g., by "clicking" online. 93
The majority referenced Justice Abella's concurring opinion finding that the
contract was not enforceable based upon "other considerations," 94 and
concluded that it "prefer[red] to address these considerations at the 'strong
cause' step of the test." 95 The majority then moved on to the heart of the
analysis, the application of the strong cause test to the facts of the case. It
concluded that a number of different factors, when considered collectively,.
supported the conclusion that the forum selection clause in favor of
California should be displaced.96 The majority divided the analysis here into
two parts: "public policy" and "secondary factors."
The first public policy consideration militating against enforcing the forum
selection clause was the "gross inequality of bargaining power between the
parties." 97 The Court noted that Facebook was a multi-billion dollar
company, while the plaintiff was an individual who had agreed to an online
contract of adhesion.98 Consumers like the plaintiff are "faced with little
choice but to accept Facebook's terms of use."99 In response to Facebook's
suggestion that the plaintiff could simply have rejected Facebook's terms, the
majority noted that in the internet era, "[h]aving the choice to remain 'offline'
may not be a real choice . . . "1oo
The second public policy consideration that the majority considered in
rejecting the stay of proceedings related to the rights that were being asserted
in the underlying lawsuit. The majority noted that the core issue in this case
was the plaintiffs right to privacy. 101 The majority observed that privacy
legislation has been accorded quasi-constitutional status, and that the Court
has repeatedly emphasized the significance of privacy rights.1 02 The majority
was of the view that "since Ms. Douez's matter requires an interpretation of
a statutory privacy tort, only a local court's interpretation of privacy rights
under the Privacy Act will provide clarity and certainty about the scope of
92 Electronic Transactions Act, S.B.C. 2001, c. 10, art. 15 (Can.).
9 Douez, 2017 SCC 33, at para. 46.
94 Id. at para. 47.
95 Id.
96 Id. at para. 50.
9 Id. at para. 54.
98 Id.
9o Id. at para. 55.
10 Id. at para. 56.
101 Id. at para. 59.
102 Id.
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the rights to others in the province." 103 The majority further stated that British
Columbia's creation of a statutory cause of action demonstrates "an intention
to create local rights and protections" for British Columbia residents, and that
local courts are "better placed to adjudicate these sorts of claims . . . ."104 The
majority concluded that these two public policy considerations-disparity of
bargaining power and the nature of the rights at issue-weighed heavily
against enforcing the forum selection clause.105
In addition, the majority considered two secondary factors in determining
that the forum selection clause should not be enforced: the "interests of
justice" and "comparative convenience and expense of litigating in the
alternate forum."1 06 The majority described the former as concerned with
"which forum is best positioned to hear the case on its merits." 107 The
majority indicated that irrespective of whether California would hear the case
and/or apply the Privacy Act, British Columbia courts were better positioned
to adjudicate the matters at issue.108 The judges noted that "[a British
Columbia court], as compared with a California one, is better placed to assess
the purpose and intent of the legislation and to decide whether public policy
or legislative intent prevents parties from opting out of rights created by the
Privacy Act through a choice of law clause."1 09 With respect to the latter
factor, the majority believed that the comparative expense and convenience
of litigating in California vs. British Columbia bolstered the strong cause
test. 110 The majority accepted the chamber judge's finding that "it would be
more convenient to have Facebook's books and records made available for
inspection in British Columbia than requiring the plaintiff to travel to
California to advance her claim."111 It concluded that, although these
secondary factors "might not have justified a finding of strong cause on their
own, they nonetheless support our conclusion that Ms. Douez has established
sufficiently strong reasons why the forum selection clause should not be
enforced and the action should proceed in British Columbia."ll 2
2. The Concurrence (Abella, J.)
Justice Abella agreed with the two-step approach endorsed by the majority:
103 Id.
104 Id. at para. 60.
1os Id. at para. 63.
106 Id. at para. 64.
107 Id. at para. 65.
108 Id.
'" Id. at para. 72.
'j0 Id. at para. 73.
' Id. at para. 74.
112 Id. at para. 75.
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first, consider whether the clause is enforceable as a matter of contract law,
and second, consider whether there is strong cause for departing from the
choice of forum in the clause. 113 In Justice Abella's view, the clause in
question failed at step one of the test. 114 Justice Abella primarily focused on
the doctrine of public policy for invalidating the clause in question as a matter
of contract law. She emphasized the adhesive nature of these consumer
contracts and the artificial notion of consent:
We are dealing here with an online consumer contract of adhesion.
Unlike Pompey, there is virtually no opportunity on the part of the
consumer to negotiate the terms of the clause. To become a member of
Facebook, one must accept all the terms stipulated in the terms of use.
No bargaining, no choice, no adjustments.
Online contracts such as the one in this case put traditional contract
principles to the test. What does "consent" mean when the agreement is
said to be made by pressing a computer key? Can it realistically be said
that the consumer turned his or her mind to all the terms and gave
meaningful consent? In other words, it seems to me that some legal
acknowledgment should be given to the automatic nature of the
commitments made with this kind of contract, not for the purpose of
invalidating the contract itself, but at the very least to intensify the
scrutiny for clauses that have the effect of impairing a consumer's
access to possible remedies.' 1 5
Justice Abella also highlighted the burden of forum selection clauses on
consumers, including "added costs, logistical impediments and delays, [as
well as] deterrent psychological effects." 1 6 Justice Abella was particularly
concerned about the use of forum selection clauses that unduly impeded a
consumer's ability to vindicate constitutional or quasi-constitutional rights in
domestic courts. 117 Like the majority, she viewed the nature of the claims at
issue-the assertion of privacy rights-to be significant to the analysis.
According to Justice Abella, section 4 of the Privacy Act was intended to
grant exclusive jurisdiction to British Columbia courts over privacy torts.1 18
Where a legislature grants exclusive jurisdiction to its own courts, this
necessarily overrides a forum selection clause in a private contract. 119
113 Id. at para. 93 (Abella, J., concurring).
114 Id. atpara. 96.
115 Id. at paras. 98-99.
116 Id. at para. 101. She notes that Professor Purcell refers to these constraints as "burdens
of distance" or "burdens of geography." Id.
I" Id. at para. 104.
119 Id. at para. 107.
"19 Id. at para. 108.
2018] 195
196 BOSTON UNIVERSITYINTERNATIONAL LAWJOURNAL [Vol 36:177
Accordingly, it would be against public policy to enforce a forum selection
clause in a contract that would have the effect of ousting the jurisdiction of a
"statutorily mandated court" in a matter as important as privacy rights. 120
Justice Abella also held that the doctrine of unconscionability-what she
called "a close jurisprudential cousin to both public policy and gross
bargaining disparity"-also applied so as to render the forum selection clause
in Douez unenforceable as a matter of contract law.12 1 She saw both elements
of the doctrine (inequality of bargaining power and unfairness) as being
satisfied in the Douez case. In this respect, Justice Abella stated:
In my view, both elements are met here. The inequality of bargaining
power between Facebook and Ms. Douez in an online contract of
adhesion gave Facebook the unilateral ability to require that any legal
grievances Ms. Douez had, could not be vindicated in British Columbia
where the contract was made, but only in California where Facebook
has its head office. This gave Facebook an unfair and overwhelming
procedural-and potentially substantive-benefit. This, to me, is a
classic case of unconscionability. 122
Because Justice Abella found the forum selection clause unenforceable under
step one of Pompey, there was no need to consider whether it also would have
failed under step two.1 23
3. The Dissent (McLachlin, C.J. and Moldaver and Ct6, JJ.)
The dissent also reaffirmed the two-step Pompey framework for the
enforceability of forum selection clauses in consumer contracts. However, in
the dissent's view, this was simply a case where the plaintiff had not shown
strong cause for displacing an otherwise enforceable forum selection
clause. 124
The dissent started its analysis by examining the arguments raised by the
plaintiff in resisting the enforcement of the forum selection clause as a matter
of contract law. First, the plaintiff had tried arguing that the forum selection
clause was not specifically brought to her attention. 12 5 The dissent did not
find this argument persuasive, noting that under the Electronic Transactions
Act, an "enforceable contract may be formed by clicking an appropriately
120 Id.
121 Id. at para. 112.
122 Id. at para. 116.
123 Justice Abella would have endorsed a broader version of the strong cause test. Id. at
para. 94 ("Unlike my colleagues in dissent, I think, with respect, that a compelling argument
can be made for modifying the strong cause test to include a wider range of factors than the
forum non conveniens kind of considerations that have been traditionally applied . . .
124 Id. at para. 170 (McLachlin, C.J., dissenting).
125 Id. at para. 136.
FORUM SELECTION CLA USES
designated online icon."126 Since the plaintiff did agree to the terms of use
by clicking such an icon, this "suffices to indicate acceptance." 127 Second,
the plaintiff argued that the terms of use contradicted the forum selection
clause. 128 Specifically, she argued that "[t]he tension between the strict terms
of the forum selection clause in the contract, and the provision that Facebook
will 'strive to respect local laws', introduces an ambiguity, rendering the
forum selection clause unenforceable." 1 29 The dissent also rejected this
argument, stating that "[t]he contract on its face is clear. There is no
inconsistency between a commitment to 'strive' to apply local laws and an
agreement that disputes will be tried in California. A forum selection clause
does not disrespect the laws of British Columbia." 1 30 Finally, the plaintiff
argued that the Privacy Act invalidates forum selection clauses for actions
brought under the Privacy Act. 131 In particular, she argued that section 4
provided for exclusive jurisdiction over Privacy Act claims in British
Columbia courts. 132 Again, the dissent disagreed. The dissent viewed section
4 as granting subject-matter jurisdiction over Privacy Act claims to the
Supreme Court of British Columbia, to the exclusion of other British
Columbia courts. 133 Accordingly, nothing in the Act should be construed as
rendering an otherwise valid forum selection clause unenforceable. The
dissent also commented on Justice Abella's holding that the forum selection
clause was unconscionable and contrary to public policy. With respect to the
former, the dissent held that an argument based on unconscionability "would
have to be based on evidence; none was adduced in this case."1 34 With respect
to the latter, the dissent indicated that a court could not invalidate a
contractual provision simply because "it is contrary to public policy in the
abstract."1 35
After concluding that step one of the Pompey test had been satisfied, the
dissent proceeded to analyze whether the plaintiff had demonstrated strong
cause for departing from the forum selection clause. In doing so, the dissent
specifically considered the factors outlined in Pompey. First, the dissent
indicated that the plaintiff had not shown that the facts and evidence shifted
the balance of convenience from California to British Columbia.1 36 In
126 Id. at para. 137.
127 Id. at para. 138.
128 Id. at para. 139.
129 Id.
130 Id. at para. 140.
131 Id. at para. 141.
132 Id.
133 Id. at para. 142.
134 Id. at para. 145 (citation omitted).
135 Id. at para. 147.
136 Id. at para. 163.
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particular, the dissent found that there was "no evidence" regarding the
relative convenience and expense of trial in one jurisdiction versus the
other. 137 Second, the dissent did not view the applicable law as providing
strong cause to override the forum selection clause. It pointed out that
applying the Privacy Act (to the extent that British Columbia law would
apply) does not require special knowledge or expertise. 138 Moreover, the
dissent reasoned that if "possible sensitivity to local context [were] sufficient
to show strong cause, forum selection clauses [would] never be upheld where
a tort occurs in a different country."1 39 Third, the dissent held that the country
with which the parties are connected does not establish strong cause. In order
to show strong cause, a plaintiff must do more than simply point out that she
lives in the jurisdiction where she seeks to have the action tried. 140 Fourth,
there was no indication that the defendant inserted the clause in the contract
merely to seek out a procedural advantage. 141 It was clear that the defendant's
purpose in designating California as the forum for the resolution of disputes
was to "avoid costly and uncertain litigation in foreign countries, which ...
would increase its costs and divert its energy." 42 Finally, the dissent
concluded that the plaintiff had not shown that enforcement of the forum
selection clause would deprive the plaintiff of a fair trial.1 43 Accordingly, the
dissent held that "all of the [Pompey] factors .. .point to enforcing the forum
selection clause to which Ms. Douez agreed."l 44
IV. TAKING A CLOSER LOOK AT DOUEZ V. FACEBOOK
Douez represents a very significant shift in the law relating to forum
selection clauses. How this shift has taken place-largely through a very
expansive and selective interpretation of the Pompey strong cause test-is
problematic. Below, this Article analyzes five aspects of the Douez decision
that are likely to cause issues for courts in the future.
A. The Majority's Use of "Public Policy " Factors to Displace the Forum
Selection Clause is Problematic
The majority's decision in Douez centered on two public policy factors
that, collectively, supported the plaintiffs showing of strong cause to not
enforce the forum selection clause: the disparity in bargaining power between
137 Id. at para. 164.
138 Id. at para. 165.
139 Id.
140 Id. at para. 167.
141 Id. at para. 168.
142 Id.
144 Id. at para. 169.
14 Id. at para. 170.
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the parties and the nature of the rights at issue. Each of these public policy
factors is examined in turn.
1. Unequal Bargaining Power
The majority in Douez focused on the gross inequality of bargaining power
between the parties to support the conclusion that the plaintiff had
demonstrated strong cause to displace the forum selection clause. The
defendant is a multi-billion dollar global conglomerate with a net worth
higher than most small countries. 14 5 The plaintiff is an individual consumer
who, presumably, has limited resources. The contract presented to the
plaintiff was one of adhesion; the plaintiff had no ability to dispute or change
the terms of the bargain. The majority believed that this huge disparity in
resources and bargaining power between the defendant and the plaintiff
provided strong cause for departing from the forum selection clause in favor
of California. 146
The problem with the majority's logic is that the disparity in bargaining
power is in no way unique to this case. 147 Virtually every consumer contract
will share the same hallmarks as the contract in Douez. Consumers enter into
dozens of contracts of adhesion where there is no opportunity to negotiate,
and, functionally, no alternative but to accept the terms. Contracts with cell
phone providers, banks, natural gas companies, car rental agencies, payday
lenders, automobile dealerships, airlines, and online merchants are just a
sampling of the contracts that consumers routinely enter into with absolutely
no power to change the terms of the deal.1 48
Take, for instance, a consumer's contract with Verizon for cell phone
service. Verizon is a large, multi-billion dollar business. 149 When a consumer
145 See Matt Egan, Facebook and Amazon Hit $500 Billion Milestone, CNN MONEY (July
27, 2017, 10:29 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2017/07/27/investing/facebook-amazon-500-
billion-bezos-zuckerberg/index.html [https://perma.cc/4NUZ-DMP6].
146 Douez, 2017 SCC 33, at para. 76.
147 At one point in the judgment, the majority attempts to argue that there is something
unique about Facebook that renders the non-choice aspect particularly difficult, compared to
other consumer transactions. The majority states, ". . . unlike a standard retail transaction,
there are few comparable alternatives to Facebook, a social networking platform with
extensive reach." Id. at para. 56. It seems like the majority is attempting to distinguish a
"standard retail transaction" from a contract with Facebook. The distinction, however, is one
without a difference. In a standard retail transaction (e.g., a contract with a bank, a contract
for an airplane ticket, etc.), a consumer may have a choice to select a competitor's product,
but will not have any choice but to agree to a contract of adhesion.
148 See generally Nora K. Duncan, Adhesion Contracts: A Twentieth Century Problem
for a Nineteenth Century Code, 34 LA. L. REv. 1081 (1973).
149 See Michael J. de la Merced & Mark Scott, Verizon Seals Long-Sought $130 Billion
Deal to Own Wireless Unit, N.Y. TIMEs (Sept. 2, 2013, 12:29 PM), https://
dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/09/02/verizon-reaches-1 30-billion-deal-to-buy-out-vodafones-
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wishes to purchase Verizon wireless services, he or she is provided with a
contract which is non-negotiable.' 5 0 The consumer either accepts the terms,
or does not. Much like the "choice" afforded to the plaintiff in Douez, i.e.,
the choice not to accept Facebook's terms of use, a consumer technically has
the choice not to accept the terms of the Verizon contract. However, since
every cell phone provider has standard form, non-negotiable contracts, the
consumer is stuck agreeing to something, or foregoing phone service
altogether. Accordingly, everything that the majority said regarding the
plaintiffs relationship with Facebook could easily have been said about an
average consumer's relationship with Verizon-not to mention hundreds of
other companies. There was really nothing unique about the facts of Douez
that rendered it anything other than a run-of-the-mill consumer contract of
adhesion.151
The Douez majority seemed to be saying that the very fact that the contract
involves a consumer and is one of adhesion is what provides strong cause for
displacing a forum selection clause.1 52 This could prove to be a very
expansive holding. It would mean that a forum selection clause can be
displaced simply by showing that the consumer contract is one of adhesion-
which will likely comprise ninety-nine percent of consumer contracts. In
effect, there would be a presumption of non-enforceability of forum selection
clauses in consumer contracts.1 53
wireless-stake/?_r-0 [https://perma.cc/P43Q-L3CU].
Iso See Customer Agreement, VERIZON WIRELESS, https://www.verizonwireless.com/
legal/notices/customer-agreement/ [https://perma.cc/4J77-DLDX].
15' See Pavlovi6, supra note 10, at 421-22 ("The terms of consumer contracts are non-
negotiable, and are presented to consumers on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. Using the standard
of a powerful consumer, the courts start from a premise that consumers have a choice to 'turn
down' a standard-form contract by not getting the goods and services. While the consumers
may have an option to choose an alternative provider, the alternative will, by-and-large, be
conditional upon another standard-form contract. The essential terms (such as price or
duration) of the new contract may be different from the contract which the consumers refused,
but its general terms (such as warranties, limitations of liability, or jurisdictional issues) are
likely to be identical.").
152 Granted, there was a separate policy consideration which, together with the gross
inequality of bargaining power, is what led the majority to the conclusion that the forum
selection clause should be displaced. See Douez, 2017 SCC 33, at para. 33. But given the
general tenor of the reasoning of the majority, coupled with Justice Abella's reinforcing of the
inequality of consumer contracts of adhesion (going so far as to invalidate the forum selection
clause as a matter of contract law), it appears that the very fact that a contract is a consumer
contract of adhesion will go a long way towards establishing strong cause for overriding the
forum selection clause. See id. at para. 63.
153 See also Stephen Pitel, Law on Jurisdiction Clauses Changes in Canada, CONFLICT
OF LAWS.NET (June 24, 2017), http://conflictoflaws.net/2017/law-on-jurisdiction-clauses-
changes-in-canada/ [https://perma.cc/HA4K-JDMP] ("If these factors are sufficient, then a
great many exclusive jurisdiction clauses in standard form contracts with consumers are
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One final observation: at one point in the judgment, the majority seemed
to suggest that contracts between individuals and social media platforms (or
at least Facebook) were somehow more "important" than other sorts of
consumer contracts-and therefore worthier of increased protection.1 54 In its
analysis, the majority distinguished between a "standard retail transaction"
and the plaintiff s contract with Facebook:
[U]nlike a standard retail transaction there are few comparable
alternatives to Facebook, a social networking platform with extensive
reach. British Columbians who wish to participate in the many online
communities that interact through Facebook must accept that
company's terms or choose not to participate in its ubiquitous social
network. As the intervener the Canadian Civil Liberties Association,
emphasizes, "access to Facebook and social media platforms, including
the online communities they make possible, has become increasingly
important for the exercise of free speech, freedom of association and
for full participation in democracy." Having the choice to remain
"offline" may not be a real choice in the Internet era.155
In this passage, the majority appears to elevate contracts with social media
providers to some level of comparative importance. Assuming that contracts
can be categorized as "more" or "less" important, 156 consumer contracts
involving living essentials, transportation, bank accounts, etc. would
presumably be more important than contracts involving social media. To the
extent that the majority intended to distinguish between different types of
contracts, it stands to reason that what is predominantly viewed by most as a
form of distraction or entertainment would be worthy of less consumer
protection, not more. 157
subject to being defeated on a similar basis. Lots of consumer contracts involve unequal
bargaining strength and are in essence 'take it or leave it' contracts. And it may well not be
that difficult for claims to be advanced, alongside other claims, that involve some form of
quasi-constitutional rights (the breadth of this is untested). This possibility that many other
clauses do not provide the protection once thought is likely the most notable dimension of the
decision.").
154 At the very least, the majority suggested they were different. However, the suggestion
that these sorts of contracts were different was, in turn, used to support the argument that forum
selection clauses should be displaced in this context. See Douez, 2017 SCC 33, at para. 56.
15 Id. (citation omitted).
156 Similar to the argument made in Part IV.A.2., infra, with respect to privacy rights, it
seems to be bad policy for courts to get into any sort of weighing of the underlying importance
of the type of contract at issue.
'5 As noted by the dissent, "the strength of the contention of unequal bargaining power
seems tenuous, when one realizes that Ms. Douez received the Facebook services she wanted,
for free and without any compulsion, practical or otherwise. Even if remaining "offline' may
not be a real choice in the internet era', as suggested by our colleagues Karakatsanis, Wagner
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2. The Privacy Rights at Issue
In addition to the disparity in bargaining power, the majority in Douez
concentrated on the nature of the rights at issue in concluding that the strong
cause test was satisfied. The majority repeatedly emphasized the importance
of privacy rights, their quasi-constitutional status, and the concern that only
a local court's interpretation of the Privacy Act would provide "clarity and
certainty about the scope of the rights to others in the province."1 58
The majority's focus on the nature of the rights at issue is problematic for
a myriad of reasons. First, the majority has seemed to inject a hierarchy of
rights into the strong cause analysis-something that will undoubtedly lead
to confusion and inconsistency. 159 It is certainly true that British Columbia
residents should not have their privacy rights infringed. So too, British
Columbia residents should not pay usurious rates of interest, be stuck with
penalties for breach of contract, or be subject to draconian exculpatory
clauses. However, it is difficult to say, in the abstract, that one set of claims
or rights is more important than another, such that a forum selection clause
should be overridden. If lower courts begin to consider the nature of the rights
at issue, and their respective importance in a scheme of rights, parties will
never have any sense of whether a forum selection clause will be enforceable.
Second, even if it were appropriate to examine the nature of the rights at
issue, then the focus should be on the particulars of case at hand-not
"privacy rights" in the abstract.1 60 The reality is that the plaintiff in Douez
was seeking monetary damages for an alleged misappropriation of her image
and Gascon JJ. (at para. 56), there is no evidence that foregoing Facebook equates with being
'offline'. In any case, enforcement of the forum selection clause does not deprive Ms. Douez,
or anyone else, of access to Facebook." Id. at para. 173 (McLachlin, C.J., dissenting).
118 Id. at para. 59 (majority opinion).
'59 See id.
160 Facebook made a similar argument in its submission to the Supreme Court of Canada:
Similarly, the Appellant's attempts to supply "strong cause" based on abstract
arguments about the importance of privacy legislation are unavailing. Facebook does
not dispute the importance of privacy protection or the quasi-Constitutional status of
certain privacy legislation. But this case is about whether the parties' agreed-upon
forum selection clause should be enforced. This involves considerations of whether the
agreed-upon court could or would enforce the Appellant's privacy rights. In the courts
below, the Appellant presented no evidence on this question despite having the burden
of proof.
The Appellant cannot fill the evidentiary vacuum by arguing now in the abstract that
privacy is afforded quasi-Constitutional status in Canada. These arguments are beside
the point and do not speak to any of the issues on which the Appellant failed in her onus
to present evidence.
Respondent's Factum, Douez v. Facebook, SCC File No. 36616, at paras. 98-99.
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that took place in 2011 in connection with Facebook's Sponsored Stories.1 61
The plaintiff identified only one instance where her image was
misappropriated.1 62 To the extent that a monetary remedy would be
appropriate for the plaintiff, one would surmise it to be fairly low. 163 The
Douez case was not about safeguarding the plaintiffs privacy rights, or the
privacy rights of over a million British Columbia residents. Facebook
stopped the practice complained of many years ago. The Douez case was
about having Facebook pay damages to plaintiffs, many (if not most) of
whom do not know or care that their image was used by Facebook for
commercial purposes." Thus, given the particular factual matrix in this case,
it seems that the intense emphasis on "privacy rights" may not have been
appropriate.
Third, the majority uncritically assumed that the Privacy Act would (or
should) apply to the case, and then used this as a critical fact to displace the
forum selection clause in favor of California. 165 However, what law applies
to the dispute is actually an open question. The choice of law clause in
Facebook's terms of use provides that "[t]he laws of the State of California
will govern this Statement, as well as any claim that might arise between you
and us, without regard to conflict of laws provisions."l 66 Following normal
conflict of laws principles, it appears that a British Columbia court would be
obligated to apply California law.1 67 Importantly, the clause excludes the
161 The plaintiff also sought an injunction, but Facebook stopped its Sponsored Stories
in 2014. See Drew Hendricks, Facebook To Drop Sponsored Stories: What Does This Mean
For Advertisers?, FORBES (Jan. 16, 2014, 5:16 PM), https://www.forbes.com/
sites/drewhendricks/2014/01/16/facebook-to-drop-sponsored-stories-what-does-this-mean-
for-advertisers/#4285fbl02a81 [https://perma.cc/C7XQ-HBAE].
162 Notice of Civil Claim, Douez v. Facebook, Inc., 2017 SCC 33, at para. 40 (Can.) (No.
VLC-S-S-122316) ("On at least one occasion since January 25, 2011, Facebook authored a
Sponsored Story which displayed the plaintiffs name and portrait to at least one of her Friends
in the following format: 'Debbie Douez likes Cool Entrepreneurs."').
161 In the corresponding U.S. class action against Facebook with respect to Sponsored
Stories, the parties reached a settlement whereby the maximum amount payable to any
individual plaintiff would be $10. See Notice of Class Action and Proposed Settlement at 1,
Fraley, et al. v. Facebook Inc., No. CV- 1-01726 RS (N.D. Cal., filed Apr. 4, 2011), http://
docs.fraleyfacebooksettlement.com/docs/notice.pdf [https://perma.cc/KUD8-EJJH].
16 By this, I do not mean to suggest that the actions of Facebook were legal or
appropriate.
165 See Douez, 2017 SCC 33, at para. 59.
166 Id. at para. 8.
167 Janet Walker, Castel and Walker: Canadian Conflict of Laws, 61 Edition § 31.3
(2005) ("The [Vita Food Products Inc. v. Unus Shipping Co.] decision therefore stands for
two fundamental principles of choice of law. One is that the parties' choice of a system of law
to govern their agreement will be given effect. The other is that provisions of a law other than
the proper law will generally not be regarded as affecting the parties' contractual
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possibility of renvoi, meaning that a British Columbia court is directed to
apply internal California law, without regard to what law a court in California
might otherwise apply under a domestic choice of law analysis. 168 Thus,
absent some other basis for applying British Columbia law, California law
seems to govern the claim at issue. If this is true, then the argument for
displacing the forum selection clause based on the importance of applying
the Privacy Act is rendered nugatory.
There is another possibility, however. It could be that the Privacy Act is
considered "mandatory law" from which the parties cannot derogate by way
of contract. The majority alluded to this possibility when it stated, "even if a
choice of law clause is generally enforceable, local laws may still apply to a
dispute if the local forum intends such laws to be mandatory and not
avoidable through a choice of law clause." 1 69 However, the majority of the
Supreme Court did not seem to consider the Privacy Act to be mandatory
law, or presumably, it would have said as much in its judgment. 170
Even assuming that the Privacy Act were mandatory law, there is no
indication that California law does not provide equal (or even greater)
privacy protection for individuals than British Columbia law does. Normally,
the concern underlying the notion of mandatory law is that one of the parties
will choose a law in order to deliberately avoid an important law of the
forum.171 For instance, assume a contract between an employee based in
Ontario and an employer based in Florida. The contract is governed by
Florida law, which allows termination at-will, with no notice to the employee.
The law in Ontario, on the other hand, requires an employer to provide at
least two weeks' notice to an employee who is being terminated. It may be
that an Ontario court regards Ontario's employment law as mandatory law
that cannot be avoided through the choice to have Florida law govern the
dispute. If, however, Florida law provided equal protection to terminated
employees, then it would be nonsensical to categorize Ontario law as
mandatory law. Accordingly, if California law provided privacy protection
obligations.").
65 Douez, 2017 SCC 33, at para. 8.
69 Id. at para. 70.
170 Additionally, the majority refers in a different part of the judgment to the fact that
choice of law is an open question. If the Privacy Act were mandatory law, then choice of law
would not be an open question. See id. at para. 69.
171 Philip J. McConnaughay, Reviving the "Public Law Taboo" in International Conflict
of Laws, 35 STAN. J. INT'L L. 255, 303-04 (1999) ("Mandatory rules are 'rules of law of a
country which cannot be derogated from by contract.' A mandatory law 'applies irrespective
of or despite the proper law of a contract,' whether determined by a contractual choice of law
clause or the conflicts rules that apply in the absence of a contractual designation. In that sense,
mandatory laws are largely equivalent to laws within that prong of the public law taboo
forbidding the displacement of forum public law. . . . Mandatory law, like public law, is said
to be 'designed to protect the public interest . . .[o]r the . . . weaker against a stronger party."').
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akin to that provided under the Privacy Act, then a court would be hard-
pressed to maintain that the Privacy Act must apply (and, further, must be
applied only by a British Columbia court). 172
Although apparently not argued in Douez, California has a statute that is
very similar to the Privacy Act. Section 3344 of California's Right of
Publicity Statute provides, in part:
Any person who knowingly uses another's name, voice, signature,
photograph, or likeness, in any manner, on or in products, merchandise,
or goods, or for purposes of advertising or selling, or soliciting
purchases of, products, merchandise, goods or services, without such
person's prior consent, or, in the case of a minor, the prior consent of
his parent or legal guardian, shall be liable for any damages sustained
by the person or persons injured as a result thereof. In addition, in any
action brought under this section, the person who violated the section
shall be liable to the injured party or parties in an amount equal to the
greater of seven hundred fifty dollars ($750) or the actual damages
suffered by him or her as a result of the unauthorized use, and any
profits from the unauthorized use that are attributable to the use and are
not taken into account in computing the actual damages. In establishing
such profits, the injured party or parties are required to present proof
only of the gross revenue attributable to such use, and the person who
violated this section is required to prove his or her deductible expenses.
Punitive damages may also be awarded to the injured party or parties.
The prevailing party in any action under this section shall also be
entitled to attorney's fees and costs. 173
The California Right of Publicity Statute is actually more protective of the
right to privacy than the Privacy Act. California law provides for a minimum
of USD $750 for a violation of the statute, or such damages actually
suffered. 174 Additionally, the plaintiff may recover "any profits" the
defendant made from the unauthorized use of the plaintiff's likeness, thereby
requiring the defendant to disgorge any benefit it received from the
unauthorized use. 175 In appropriate cases, the plaintiff may be awarded
172 See Respondent's Factum, Douez v. Facebook, SCC File No. 36616, at para. 95 ("For
the Appellant to satisfy her burden of converting these assertions into 'strong cause', there
must be actual evidence of the private international law of the forum named in the contract
showing, for example, that the interests implicated by the relevant statute (the Privacy Act)
would not be protected in that forum. Yet the Appellant offered no expert evidence at all of
California law to ground this argument.").
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punitive damages. 176 Finally, the plaintiff may also be entitled to attorney's
fees and costs. 177
In light of California's Right of Publicity Statute, the majority's exclusive
focus on the Privacy Act, and its treatment of the Act as being somehow
unique to British Columbia and capable of interpretation only by a British
Columbia court, seems misplaced. If the majority wanted to focus on the
nature of the claim at issue-privacy rights-then the analysis should not
have centered on the Privacy Act as the exclusive vehicle for vindicating
privacy rights. Rather, the Court should have considered whether British
Columbians' privacy rights could have been vindicated in the chosen forum
(California).178 There is no indication that a California court could not have
resolved the claims at issue in Douez, whether under British Columbia law
or under California law. 179
176 Id.
177 Id.
'7 Interestingly, the Canadian Civil Liberties Association argued in favor of a modified
strong cause test in the context of privacy claims, yet conceded that the appropriate inquiry
should focus on whether the alternative forum provided sufficient privacy protection. See
Factum of the Canadian Civil Liberties Association et. al., Douez v. Facebook, SCC File No.
36616, at para. 26 ("The need to give this public policy consideration legal effect is required
by the decision of the British Columbia legislature to create the statutory tort. The British
Columbia legislature can be presumed to have intended to provide a remedy for British
Columbians for breach of their quasi constitutional privacy interests, consistent with the need
to provide meaningful protection for this quasi constitutional interest. Before an individual
can be said to be contractually obligated to seek enforcement of those rights elsewhere,
Canadian courts should be satisfied that the other jurisdiction will ensure that those rights
can, legally and practically, be enforced.") (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). This analysis
of whether the alternative forum (California) would ensure the enforcement of privacy rights
was wholly absent in Douez. See Douez, 2017 SCC 33, at para. 165.
179 It is highly likely that a California court would apply the latter:
Nor does the applicable law show strong cause to override the forum selection clause,
in our view. It is true that the law giving rise to the tort is a British Columbia statute.
However, the British Columbia tort created by the Privacy Act does not require special
expertise. The courts of California have not been shown to be disadvantaged in
interpreting the Act as compared with the Supreme Court of British Columbia. The most
the motions judge could say on this factor was that local courts may be more sensitive
to the social and cultural context and background relevant to privacy interests of British
Columbians, as compared to courts in a foreign jurisdiction. This could be important in
determining the degree to which privacy interests have been violated and any damages
that flow from this. If possible sensitivity to local context is sufficient to show strong
cause, forum selection clauses will never be upheld where a tort occurs in a different
country. What this factor contemplates is evidence that the local court will be better
placed to interpret the legal provisions at issue than the court stipulated in the forum
selection clause. Ms. Douez presented no such evidence.
Douez, 2017 SCC 33, at para. 165 (citation omitted).
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Finally, the majority's focus on privacy rights is problematic in light of its
brief acknowledgement that the Privacy Act might not apply, even ifthe case
were heard in British Columbia. The majority stated, "[t]his court, as
compared to a California one, is better placed to assess the purpose and intent
of the legislation and to decide whether public policy or legislative intent
prevents parties from opting out of rights created by the Privacy Act through
a choice of law clause in favour of a foreign jurisdiction."18 0 This passage
undercuts the very basis upon which the majority held that the forum
selection clause should be displaced. The majority's reasoning is predicated
on the right to privacy embodied in the Privacy Act being of such critical
importance that the entire action belongs in British Columbia, despite the
forum selection clause in favor of California. If there is the possibility that a
British Columbia court could decide that California-and not British
Columbia-law applies, then how can the Privacy Act, and the rights
enshrined in it, provide the basis for the plaintiff showing strong cause to
depart from the forum selection clause? In other words, a major part of the
premise underlying the majority's judgment is that the action needed to be
heard in British Columbia to vindicate the privacy rights granted to the
plaintiff under British Columbia law. That premise is gutted by the
(seemingly) newly introduced possibility that California law might actually
apply to the action. Overall, the majority failed to adequately reconcile the
choice of law question with its conclusion that the significance of the privacy
rights at issue militated in favor of hearing the action in British Columbia.
B. The "Secondary Factors" Used by the Majority Do Not Support
Displacing the Forum Selection Clause
The majority focused primarily on the public policy factors in the strong
cause analysis. However, it bolstered its analysis by looking at what it called
"secondary factors": the interests of justice and comparative convenience.
Neither of these secondary factors provides strong cause for departing from
the forum selection clause. Again, each of these factors is addressed in turn.
1. Interests of Justice
The majority indicated that the interests of justice militated in favor of
having the action heard in British Columbia. The majority stated that this
"factor is concerned not only with whether enforcement of the forum
selection clause would unfairly cause the loss of a procedural advantage, but
also with which forum is best positioned to hear the case on its merits."18 1 It
is unclear where the interests of justice factor comes from, or how to
specifically gauge which forum is "best positioned" to hear the case in a way
18o Id. at para. 72.
81 Id. at para. 65.
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that differs from considering the other forum non conveniens factors
identified in the CJPTA.1 82
In any event, the majority focused its discussion largely on whether it was
significant that the plaintiff failed to introduce evidence on whether
California would hear the case, and if so, what law California would apply.
The majority noted that the lack of evidence on these issues was "a significant
focus of the hearing before us."1 83 However, the majority did not think that
the plaintiff's failure to introduce evidence on these issues was particularly
problematic, concluding that "there is no separate requirement for the party
trying to avoid the forum selection clause to prove that her claim would
necessarily fail in the foreign jurisdiction."1 84 While this is true, the fact that
the plaintiff did not introduce this evidence must be interpreted as suggesting
that California would indeed hear the case pursuant to the forum selection
clause, which, in turn, should have weighed in favor of enforcing the clause.
The majority also concluded that the interests of justice were best served
if the matter of choice of law were adjudicated in British Columbia. The
majority believed that a British Columbia court was "better placed" to make
the choice of law determination. 185 It could be said that a domestic forum is
always going to be better positioned to determine whether, as a matter of
domestic public policy or legislative intent, domestic law or foreign law
should apply. However, the parties did not choose a domestic forum to
adjudicate the issue-they chose a foreign forum. And so, the relevant
question should have been whether the foreign forum is capable of making
the choice of law determination, guided, necessarily, by the parties' choice
of California law.
Overall, the majority's analysis related to the interests of justice is murky.
Boiled down to its essence, the majority seemed to be saying that it is in the
interests of justice to have domestic law issues, i.e., the applicability of the
Privacy Act, decided by a domestic court. Yet, the whole domain of the
conflict of laws presupposes that foreign courts are able to adjudicate matters
involving Canadian claimants and are capable of making effective choice of
law determinations. To conclude that there is strong cause for overriding a
forum selection clause because British Columbia courts are better positioned
182 Stephen Pitel argues that the Court's discussion of "secondary factors" actually melds
the forum non conveniens and strong cause inquiry, something that the Court in Douez said
should not be done. See Pitel, supra note 153 ("Leaving public policy aside for the moment,
it is telling that the secondary factors are 'the interests of justice' and 'comparative
convenience and expense'. These are the most conventional offorum non conveniens factors.
If this analysis is followed by lower courts ... the separate [strong cause] analysis might end
up not being very separate.").
183 See Douez, 2017 SCC 33, at para. 66.
184 Id. at para. 67.
181 Id. at para. 72.
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to undertake the choice of law exercise seems to be a very weak reason for
displacing a forum selection clause.
2. Comparative Convenience and Expense of Litigating in the
Alternative Forum
Finally, the majority considered the comparative expense and convenience
of litigating in the alternative forum. The majority's analysis in this respect
consists of the following two sentences:
Although Facebook argued its relevant books and records were
located in California, the chambers judge found it would be more
convenient to have Facebook's books and records made available for
inspection in British Columbia than requiring the plaintiff to travel to
California to advance her claim. There is no reason to disturb this
finding.1 86
The majority did not truly grapple with the comparative convenience and
expense of litigating in British Columbia or California. The majority made it
appear like all Facebook would have to do in order to litigate in British
Columbia would be to ship a couple of cases of "books and records" to the
16 Id. at para. 74. The motion judge's findings on this factor are fairly sparse and based
partly on conjecture and the absence of evidence on point:
Facebook submits that its head office is in California. It says that it does not keep books
and records in BC.
Facebook has not described the form of its books and records but it would surprise me
if it does not have electronic records which can readily be made available in British
Columbia. Even in paper form, there is no barrier to bringing paper from California to
BC, and there is a common language in the two jurisdictions.
There is no evidence that it would be difficult for Facebook witnesses to attend court in*
BC.
In September 2012, Facebook filed affidavit evidence that it does not have any business
operations in British Columbia. Since then, the plaintiff filed hearsay evidence of a
newspaper article in Vancouver, BC in March 2013 reporting that Facebook intended
to open an office in Vancouver in May 2013. Facebook has not filed any responsive
evidence on this point but I note that counsel for Facebook did not argue orally that
Facebook has no business operations in British Columbia, just that the relevant books
and records are with head office.
The plaintiff points out that she lives in BC, and so do the many members of the putative
class.
I find that it will be more convenient to examine the circumstances of the plaintiff in a
BC court than in a California court. There will likely be less inconvenience in having
the books and records of Facebook made available for inspection here in BC than in
having the plaintiff travel to California to advance her claim.
Douez v. Facebook, Inc., 2014 BCSC 953, paras. 110-15 (Can..), overruled by Douez v.
Facebook, Inc., 2017 SCC 33 (Can.).
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province.1 87 It failed to account for the true burden-financial and
otherwise-in having Facebook litigate the claim in British Columbia. The
majority also failed to consider how difficult or inconvenient it would be for
the plaintiff to litigate in California. To what extent would the plaintiff
actually have to travel to California to advance her claim?' 88 Would the
plaintiff be paying out-of-pocket to litigate in California? 189 Could the
plaintiff hire local California counsel to handle her case? In short, a more
robust analysis of the actual comparative inconvenience and expense should
be called for if this is to be a significant factor in the strong cause analysis.
One final observation about the comparative convenience factor in the
context of consumer claims: it is almost always going to favor the consumer
because of the inherent difficulty of the comparison. That is, how does one
truly gauge comparative convenience and expense when one party is an
individual consumer and the other is a large corporation? It is an almost
impossible exercise. A court will always be inclined to conclude that it is
comparatively more convenient for a corporation to litigate in the plaintiffs
home jurisdiction, rather than vice versa. The thinking is that even if it costs
a corporation, say, CAD $200,000 to litigate outside its home jurisdiction,1 90
the corporation is better positioned to absorb the expense and deal with the
inconvenience factor than an individual plaintiff for whom it costs, say,
$20,000. Thus, because of the inherent sympathy that a court will have for a
plaintiff who is faced with the prospect of litigating outside his or her home
jurisdiction, this factor will almost always favor the plaintiff.
C. The Majority Did Not Consider, Much Less Balance, the Relevant
Pompey Factors
One of the most glaring problems with the majority's judgment is that it
was so focused on demonstrating that the plaintiff had shown strong cause
for displacing the forum selection clause that it failed to objectively examine
all the relevant Pompey factors. 19 1 The majority, in fact, seemed to cherry-
pick factors that were favorable to the plaintiff in the strong cause test, while
ignoring countervailing factors in favor of the defendant.
18 Douez, 2017 SCC 33, at para. 74.
188 How often would the plaintiff have to physically be in California? Once for a
deposition? Once to testify at trial (if the case went to trial)? See id. at paras. 73-75.
189 Would the plaintiff actually be paying out-of-pocket for any travel expenses
associated with the case, given her contingency fee agreement with a prominent plaintiff class
action firm? See id.
10 Costs for a corporation might include travel and lodging for multiple witnesses,
shipping documents, costs associated with lost employee time, etc. Costs for an individual
might include travel and lodging, and costs associated with being temporarily out of work.
191 In fact, it its entire judgment, it failed to actually list the factors. See generally Douez,
2017 SCC 33.
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Many-if not most-of the Pompey factors favored the defendant, or were
neutral as between the parties.1 92 The first Pompey factor focuses on the
question of where the majority of evidence is located.1 93 In Douez, the
evidence is overwhelmingly situated in the United States. Yet, the majority
in Douez glossed over this fact and summarily concluded that the relative
convenience and expense of trial favored British Columbia. As the dissent
pointed out, "there is no evidence regarding the 'relative convenience and
expense of trial' in California as compared to British Columbia."l 94
The second Pompey factor looks to the law to be applied, and whether it
differs from domestic law. 195 Here, the parties agreed to a choice of law
clause in favor of California law. This should militate in favor of the
defendant. Even if a California court were to apply British Columbia law
(something that would be highly unlikely), there is no indication that
interpreting the Privacy Act "require[s] special expertise."' 96 At bottom, this
will be a case about contractual and statutory interpretation, which a
California court is surely competent to do.
The third Pompey factor examines "with what country either party is
connected, and how closely."' 97 This factor appears to be a wash, given that
the defendant is connected with California and the plaintiff (and the plaintiff
class) is connected with British Columbia. In the words of the dissent:
The country with which the parties are connected does not establish
strong cause. Facebook has its headquarters in California. Ms. Douez,
while resident in British Columbia, was content to contract with
Facebook at that location. Nothing in her situation suggests that the
class action she wishes to commence could not be conducted in
California just as easily as in British Columbia. To show strong cause
to oust a foreign selection clause on the basis of residence, the plaintiff
must point to more than the mere fact that she lives in the jurisdiction
where she seeks to have the action tried. If this sufficed, forum selection
clauses would be routinely held inoperative. 198
The fourth Pompey factor asks whether the defendant genuinely desires
trial in California, or is only seeking out the forum for procedural
192 The dissent goes through each of the factors and suggests that "all of the factors
endorsed by this Court in Pompey point to enforcing the forum selection clause to which Ms.
Douez agreed. None of them establish strong cause." Id. at para. 170 (McLachlin, C.J.,
dissenting).
1 Id. at para. 93 (Abella, J., concurring).
194 Id. at para. 164 (McLachlin, C.J., dissenting).
5 Id. at para. 93 (Abella, J., concurring).
196 Id. at para. 165 (McLachlin, C.J., dissenting).
197 Id. at para. 93 (Abella, J., concurring).
198 Id. at para. 167 (McLachlin, C.J., dissenting).
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advantages.1 99 This factor favors the defendant; there is no indication that
California was chosen for an improper purpose. Facebook's headquarters are
in California, and it stands to reason that Facebook would prefer to litigate
claims against it in a singular forum, rather than in each of the countries
where its two billion users are located.2 00
Finally, the fifth Pompey factor looks at whether the plaintiff would be
prejudiced by having to sue in California for a number of reasons (inability
to enforce a judgment, statute of limitations, etc.). 20 1 This factor again tends
to favor the defendant. There was no evidence presented that the plaintiff in
Douez would face any sort of significant prejudice in having to pursue her
claim in California.202 As the dissent correctly pointed out, "[the plaintiff]
does not and cannot take issue with the fact that the state of California has a
highly developed and fair legal system, nor with the fact that she will get a
fair trial there." 203
Instead of analyzing the actual Pompey factors, the majority premised its
decision largely on two new factors: the unequal bargaining power between
the parties, and the nature of the rights at issue.204 It then focused selectively
on the Pompey factor dealing with comparative convenience and expense,
and created another new "interests of justice" factor.20 5 In short, three of the
four main considerations in Douez were new, and not part of the original
Pompey analysis. While it is not problematic to consider new or different
factors, it is problematic that the majority did not engage in a holistic
weighing of all the Pompey factors, but rather selectively honed in only on
the factors that would support displacing the forum selection clause.
19 Id. at para. 93 (Abella, J., concurring).
200 See id. at para. 168 (McLachlin, C.J., dissenting) ("The next factor to consider is
whether the defendant is merely seeking procedural advantages. If Ms. Douez could show that
Facebook does not genuinely desire the trial to take place in California, but wants the trial
there simply to gain procedural advantages over her, this might support her case that strong
cause lies to oust the forum selection clause. However, she has not shown this. There is no
suggestion that Facebook does not genuinely wish all litigation with users to take place in
California. Indeed, it is clear it does so, for reasons of substance and convenience. The purpose
of the forum selection clause is to avoid costly and uncertain litigation in foreign countries,
which in turn would increase its costs and divert its energy."); STATISTA, https://
www.statista.com/statistics/2648 1 0/number-of-monthly-active-facebook-users-worldwide/
[https://perma.cc/72CB-7SZ4] (noting the number of Facebook users worldwide).
201 Douez, 2017 SCC 33, at para. 93.
202 If one were to add to this list additional factors that are called for in the "regular"
forum non conveniens analysis, those factors too would largely favor the defendant. See id.
203 Id. at para. 169 (McLachlin, C.J., dissenting).
204 Id. at para. 38 (majority opinion).
205 Id. at para. 65.
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D. The Majority Did Not Hold the Plaintiff to the Burden of Establishing
Strong Cause
In applying the strong cause test, the majority did not hold the plaintiff to
her burden of showing strong cause to depart from the forum selection clause.
Indeed, the majority referenced the significance of the burden of proof only
once, simply to say "[t]he burden remains on the party wishing to avoid the
clause to establish strong cause." 206 Conversely, the issue was addressed in
some depth by the dissent:
The party seeking to displace the forum selection clause bears the
burden of establishing strong cause. There are good reasons for this.
First, enforceability of forum selection clauses is the rule, setting them
aside the exception. Generally, parties seeking an exceptional
exemption must show grounds for what they seek. Second, it is the party
seeking the exception who is in the best position to argue why it should
be granted, not for the party seeking to rely on the rule to show why the
rule should not be vacated; generally, burdens fall on the party asserting
a proposition and in the best position to prove it. . . . Finally, to reverse
the burden would undermine the general rule that forum selection
clauses apply and introduce uncertainty and expense into commercial
transactions that span international borders. It would detract from the
"certainty and security in transaction" that is critical to private
international law.... Accordingly, the law in Canada and elsewhere
has consistently held that it is the plaintiff-the party seeking to set
aside the forum selection clause-who bears the burden of showing
strong cause for not giving effect to the enforceable forum selection
clause by entering a stay of proceedings. 207
The majority seemed to not appreciate the significance of the burden of
proof. It routinely overlooked failures of proof on the part of the plaintiff and
interpreted facts in the way most favorable to the plaintiff. For instance, the
plaintiff did not introduce any proof: that a California court could not have
heard her cause; that California law would not have sufficiently safeguarded
the plaintiffs privacy rights; that she could not have travelled to California
or hired local California counsel because it would have been cost-prohibitive;
or that the privacy interest in this particular case was so compelling as to
override a forum selection clause.20 8 The majority excused these failures,
206 Id. at para. 38. There are two other references to the burden of proof in the majority
judgment, but only to sum up or explain Facebook's argument.
207 See id. at para. 153 (McLachlin, C.J., dissenting) (citations omitted). See also id. at
para. 154 (explaining the reasons for embracing the strong cause test and placing the burden
on the plaintiff to prove strong cause).
208 See Douez, 2017 SCC 33, at paras. 150-67.
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stating, "none of the leading authorities on the strong cause test, Pompey
included, make proof that the claim would fail in the foreign jurisdiction a
mandatory element of strong cause" and "[u]nder the Pompey analysis, there
is no separate requirement for the party trying to avoid the forum selection
clause to prove that her claim would necessarily fail in the foreign
jurisdiction." 209 The majority further noted, "while such evidence may be
helpful, its absence is not determinative." 2 10 The majority did not appreciate
that the failure of the plaintiff to introduce any evidence on the alternative
forum (whether California would hear the case and whether California law
could provide sufficient protection for privacy rights) must weigh in favor of
the defendant in the strong cause analysis. Instead, the majority did not give
it any weight, and instead looked for any other facts that could be used to tilt
the scales in favor of British Columbia.
E. Justice Abella's Concurrence Muddies Contract Law Doctrines
Thus far, I have focused on the majority judgment holding that the plaintiff
was able to show strong cause for overriding the forum selection clause.
Justice Abella also would have refused to enforce the forum selection clause,
but for a different reason. Justice Abella concluded that that the defendant
failed to show that the forum selection clause was valid and enforceable as a
matter of contract law.2 11 Justice Abella held that that the clause was
unenforceable because it both violated public policy and was
unconscionable. 2 12
With respect to public policy, Justice Abella stated:
In general, . . . when online consumer contracts of adhesion contain
terms that unduly impede the ability of consumers to vindicate their
rights in domestic courts, particularly their quasi-constitutional or
constitutional rights ... public policy concerns outweigh those
favouring enforceability of a forum selection clause.2 13
209 Id. at para. 67 (majority opinion).
210 Id.
211 Id. at para. 96 (Abella, J., concurring).
212 Id. at paras. 108-12.
213 Id. at para. 104. Justice Abella also states:
Where a legislature grants exclusive jurisdiction to the courts of its own province, it
overrides forum selection clauses that may direct the parties to another forum. It would,
in my respectful view, be contrary to public policy to enforce a forum selection clause
in a consumer contract that has the effect of depriving a party of access to a statutorily
mandated court. To decide otherwise means that a clear legislative intention can be
overridden by a forum selection clause. This flies in the face of Pompey's
acknowledgment that legislation takes precedence over a forum selection clause.
Id. at para. 108 (citations omitted). If the legislature has indeed granted exclusive jurisdiction
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Justice Abella appears to view forum selection clauses in consumer contracts
as de facto unenforceable-since by definition, a forum selection clause in
favor of a foreign court will "impede the ability of consumers to vindicate
their rights in domestic courts." 2 14 It is not clear that this is the appropriate
inquiry.2 15 That is, the analysis should focus on whether this forum selection
clause in this contract is contrary to public policy. There is no indication that
the plaintiff s access to justice in Douez will be impeded by enforcing this
forum selection clause. The dissent makes this point as follows:
It is unclear to us how a court can invalidate a contractual provision
simply because the court finds it is contrary to public policy in the
abstract. While the court can refuse to enforce otherwise valid
contractual provisions that offend public policy, the party seeking to
avoid enforcement of the clause must prove "the existence of an
overriding public policy ... that outweighs the very strong public
interest in the enforcement of contracts." In our view, no such
overriding public policy is found on the facts of this case. 2 16
Moreover, it is fairly rare for a court to determine that a contract, or a
particular provision of a contract, violates public policy.2 17 Contracts that are
sometimes cited as violating public policy include contracts for indentured
servitude, contracts to buy and sell organs, and contracts to carry out an
unlawful act.2 18 It is not clear that a contract to litigate in a foreign
jurisdiction-one where the other party to the contract is based-runs counter
to public policy in the same way that these examples do. In finding that the
clause at issue violates public policy, Justice Abella's judgment runs the risk
of diluting contract law doctrine.
Justice Abella also concluded that the doctrine of unconscionability
rendered the forum selection clause unenforceable in this case. In order to
establish unconscionability, two elements must be present: inequality of
bargaining power and unfaimess.2 19 Justice Abella concludes:
to the courts of its own province over this claim, then the analysis should simply begin and
end there. In other words, if the courts of British Columbia have exclusive jurisdiction, then
this overrides the common law strong cause test. There is no need to consider the enforceability
of the exclusive jurisdiction clause under stage one of the strong cause test. See id.
214 Id. at para. 104.
215 Certainly, Justice Abella could have explicitly held that forum selection clauses in
consumer contracts were defacto contrary to public policy, but she did not go that far. Instead,
she seemed to use concerns about forum selection clauses generally to invalidate this forum
selection clause specifically. See id.
216 See id. at para. 147 (McLachlin, C.J., dissenting) (quoting Tercon Contractors Ltd. v.
British Columbia (Transp. & Highways), [2010] 1 S.C.R. 69, at para. 123 (Can.)).
217 Id. at para. 148.
218 See Tercon Contractors Ltd., [2010] 1 S.C.R. 69, at paras. 117-18.
219 Douez, 2017 SCC 33, at para. 115 (Abella, J., concurring).
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In my view, both elements are met here. The inequality of
bargaining power between Facebook and Ms. Douez in an online
contract of adhesion gave Facebook the unilateral ability to require that
any legal grievances Ms. Douez had, could not be vindicated in British
Columbia where the contract was made, but only in California where
Facebook has its head office. This gave Facebook an unfair and
overwhelming procedural-and potentially substantive-benefit. 220
Justice Abella failed to conduct a meaningful unconscionability analysis;
instead she cursorily concluded that this is a "classic case of
unconscionability." 221 Unconscionability as a contract doctrine focuses on
whether or not there is gross unfairness to the plaintiff.222 Nowhere in the
judgment did Justice Abella truly grapple with whether or not enforcing the
forum selection clause in favor of California would be grossly unfair.
Specifically, she did not consider whether or not enforcement of the clause
would amount to a deprivation of plaintiff's access to justice. As with the
doctrine of public policy, Justice Abella's expansive interpretation of
unconscionability risks setting too low a bar for the unconscionability
doctrine.
V. WHERE Do WE Go FROM HERE?
Douez looks like a major victory for consumers. And it may be. But, based
on how the Supreme Court of Canada came to the conclusion that the forum
selection clause was unenforceable, the net result of the decision will likely
be years of uncertainty over the legal effect of forum selection clauses. 22 3
220 Id. at para 116.
221 Id. It appears that the plaintiff did not even allege that the forum selection clause was
unconscionable. Id. at para 145 (McLachlin, C.J., dissenting). Accordingly, evidence on
unconscionability was not adduced by either party. See id. This makes Justice Abella's
conclusion that the forum selection clause was unconscionable even more of a stretch. See id.
222 Id. at paras. 38-39 (majority opinion).
223 See, e.g., Alexandra Cocks & Edmond Chen, Douez v. Facebook, Inc.: Supreme Court
of Canada decision creates new uncertainty about enforceability offorum selection clauses in
consumer contracts, MCCARTHY TtTRAULT LLP (June 30, 2017), http://
www.canadianclassactionsmonitor.com/2017/06/douez-v-facebook-inc-supreme-court-of-
canada-decision-creates-new-uncertainty-about-enforceability-of-forum-selection-clauses-in-
consumer-contracts/ [https://perma.cc/3RMT-VECS] ("The precedent set by this case creates
more uncertainty around how forum selection clauses will be applied by Canadian courts and
could give plaintiffs new ammunition to avoid forum selection clauses in pursuing their
claims."); Robin Reinerston & Joshua Hutchinson, Supreme Court of Canada Allows British
Columbians to Pursue Privacy Class Action Against Facebook, BLAKE CASSELS & GRAYDON
LLP (June 29, 2017), http://www.blakesbusinessclass.com/supreme-court- of-canada-allows-
british-columbians-to-pursue-privacy-class-action-against-facebook/ [https://perma.cc/LB2Q
-TLYU] ("This decision may result in more uncertainty with respect to the legal framework
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Under the strong cause test, as it was envisaged prior to Douez, parties were
fairly confident in where they stood on the issue of forum selection clauses:
such clauses would routinely be enforced unless there was something unique
or exceptional about the case that provided strong cause for overriding the
forum selection clause.
Professor Pavlovid recently conducted a study involving the enforceability
of forum selection clauses in consumer contracts. She examined a total of
nineteen cases, during the period between January 1, 1996 and July 1,
2016.224 The results of the survey were as follows:
The courts found that the forum-selection agreements were validly
formed in all but two cases. Out of the seventeen cases in which the
clause was found to be valid, the courts applied the strong-cause test in
all but two cases. Forum-selection clauses were enforced in twelve
cases resulting in the stay of proceedings. 225
These results are to be expected. Because the strong cause test creates a
presumption of enforceability, it is not surprising that the clauses were upheld
in twelve of the seventeen cases where the clauses were found to be validly
formed. What the data does not show is how many plaintiffs sued in the
chosen court, or chose not to sue at all because of the clause. One would
imagine that the very nature of the strong cause test, as interpreted prior to
Douez, meant that parties would be dissuaded from suing in contravention of
the clause. After Douez, plaintiffs will attempt to circumvent fqrum selection
clauses in consumer contracts (including plaintiffs who otherwise would not
have attempted to litigate in contravention of the clause). Depending on how
lower courts interpret Douez, many of these plaintiffs have a real chance at
having their forum selection clauses declared unenforceable. One should
expect years of uncertainty-and years of litigation-concerning the status
of forum selection clauses in consumer contracts. 226
The disconnect between the test that the Douez majority endorsed (the
for assessing the enforceability of forum selection clauses, but it signals that forum selection
clauses are less likely to be upheld when the contract involves consumers or privacy rights.");
Molly Reynolds et al., SCC: Facebook's Forum Selection Clause is Unenforceable, TORYS
LLP (June, 27, 2017), https://www.torys.com/insights/publications/2017/06/scc-facebooks-
forum-selection-clause-is-unenforceable (last visited Jan. 12, 2017) ("While litigating in
Canada may not represent an overly onerous burden to Facebook relative to its size, this
decision will concern online businesses that want certainty that they will not need to defend
consumer claims all over the world. The expense and uncertainty raised by this decision may
increase the cost of doing business with Canadian consumers.").
224 Pavlovid, supra note 10, at 389.
225 Id. at 405 (footnotes omitted).
226 Although litigants will surely attack forum selection clauses on both available fronts,
i.e., formation and strong cause, it is likely that most of the litigation will focus on the strong
cause test as articulated by the Douez majority. Douez, 2017 SCC 33, at para. 29.
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strong cause test from Pompey) and the test that the Douez majority applied
(a policy-based test favoring the plaintiff) will undoubtedly lead to confusion
and chaos as lower courts try to sort out the future of the strong cause test.
The confusion arises from the fact that the Douez majority held to the rhetoric
of the Pompey strong cause test, but did not actually apply it. Instead, the
majority largely abandoned the test in favor of broad policy considerations.
These policy considerations have now become the epicenter of the forum
selection clause analysis, even though they were not part of the original
Pompey strong cause test. Essentially, the majority said one thing and did
another. The majority said that it was retaining and applying the strong cause
test; in reality, it created and applied a wholly different test.
This wholly different test, which privileges policy considerations and
eschews the traditional Pompey factors, actually works to undermine the
presumption that forum selection clauses are entitled to great deference. That
is, by reformulating the test in a manner that makes policy considerations
paramount, the test is skewed in favor of displacing a forum selection clause
in a consumer contract. This makes the test pretty much the opposite of the
strong cause test. In the dissent, Justices McLachlin and Ct6 emphasized
that "[s]trong cause means what it says-it is not any cause, but strong cause.
The default position is that forum selection clauses should be enforced."227
Under the reformulated-but not renamed-strong cause test, the default
position is that forum selection clauses in consumer contracts will not be
enforced. Rather, the policy considerations and secondary factors will almost
always militate in favor of displacing forum selection clauses in consumer
contracts.
These policy considerations will prove problematic for courts to
meaningfully apply in future cases. With respect to unequal bargaining
power, the majority's analysis boils down to the argument that where there is
unequal bargaining power in a consumer contract, a forum selection clause
should not be enforced. 228 However, the nature of consumer contracts is that
they are all characterized by unequal bargaining power. Accordingly, this
public policy factor will always weigh in favor of displacing a forum
selection clause. How to apply a factor that always weighs in one direction is
a difficult question. The other public policy factor that the Douez majority
considered was the nature of the rights at issue.229 If courts begin to consider
the nature of the rights (or claims) at issue, it will invite creative pleading
and/or litigation on the significance of the underlying claim. By interjecting
this new variable into the strong cause test, the Douez majority has simply
227 Id. at para. 157 (McLachlin, C.J., dissenting).
228 Id. at paras. 111-12, 115-17 (Abella, J., concurring).
229 Id. at para. 95.
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introduced more complexity into the analysis. 230
From a certainty standpoint, it would have been preferable for the Court to
have actually overruled, or significantly modified, the strong cause test. The
Court could have said that the strong cause test does not apply in the
consumer context; instead, the court should conduct a regular forum non
conveniens analysis, with the clause being but one factor to consider. Or, the
Court could have reversed the burden of proof, requiring, in the consumer
context, the defendant to show why the clause should be upheld. Either of
these solutions would have provided more direction for courts and litigants
as to the enforceability of forum selection clauses in consumer contracts.
Certainly, companies doing business with consumers in Canada will not
be pleased with the Douez decision. The case makes it impossible for
businesses to predict whether or not they will be subject to jurisdiction in a
given Canadian forum, notwithstanding an exclusive forum selection clause
in favor of a foreign forum. While businesses may not be able to accurately
predict whether a given forum selection clause will be enforceable, it is a fair
statement to say that such clauses are less likely to be enforced post-Douez
than they were pre-Douez.
Businesses employ forum selection clauses in order to control, ex ante,
where they are subject to suit.2 31 A company that does business across
Canada would clearly prefer to litigate any claims in one singular forum
(usually its home forum), rather than ten separate ones. If businesses that
conduct business across provincial lines now face the prospect of suit in every
Canadian province, this might have second and third order effects.232
Companies might choose not to do business in Canada, or choose not to do
business in certain Canadian provinces. Alternatively, businesses may pass
on the increased costs of litigating across the country to Canadian consumers,
in the form of higher prices for goods and services.233 Some businesses may
attempt to creatively structure their affairs to avoid the Douez holding, such
as by electing to include arbitration provisions in their contracts, rather than
230 It is not a far stretch from the "nature of the rights at issue" to consider related
variables: the amount of money at stake; the significance of the claim for the plaintiff
personally; the number of claimants affected by the alleged breach; the purported willfulness
of the alleged breach; and the public interest in having the claim litigated in the plaintiffs
chosen forum. See id. at para. 58 (majority opinion); see generally Pompey, 2003 SCC 27.
231 Douez, 2017 SCC 33, at para. 123.
232 See 1400467 Alberta Ltd. v. Adderley, 2014 ABQB 339 (Can.) ("[I]nterprovincial
and international commerce depend on certainty. In the absence of assurance about the law
that will govern a contract and the jurisdiction where the law will be enforced, businesses
might be unwilling to engage with others even outside the province but within Canada; that
would have a negative effect not only on Canadian businesses, but also on Canadian customers
and consumers.").
233 "The expense and uncertainty raised by this decision may increase the cost of doing
business with Canadian consumers." Reynolds et al., supra note 223.
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forum selection clauses. 234 Suffice it to say that the impact of Douez will
definitely be felt by companies doing business in Canada.
VI. CONCLUSION
Douez marks a significant departure from existing law. Despite the
majority of the Supreme Court saying that it was applying the strong cause
test, the truth is that the majority abandoned it-at least for cases involving
(some) consumer contracts. The strong cause test, as originally envisioned,
holds parties to their bargain unless exceptional circumstances exist to justify
departing from the clause. The Douez approach, on the other hand,
considerably loosens the strong cause test, with the result that many forum
selection clauses in consumer contracts will be rendered unenforceable. At
the core of the new analysis are broad public policy considerations;
specifically, courts are directed to examine the adhesive nature of the bargain
at issue and the nature of the rights at stake in order to determine whether a
clause should be upheld. In virtually every consumer contract, the first public
policy consideration (the adhesive nature of the bargain) will militate against
enforcing the clause, and the second public policy consideration (the nature
of the rights at issue) has the potential to create a sliding scale for
enforceability of forum selection clauses depending on a judge's weighing of
the underlying significance of the legal claims. Added to the inquiry are
miscellaneous "secondary factors," along with the traditional Pompey
factors, and the result is a hodge-podge of considerations that complicate and
confuse the forum selection clause analysis. The only thing certain about the
Douez case is that it will cause years of uncertainty with respect to the fate of
forum selection clauses in consumer contracts.
234 in three provinces, pre-dispute arbitration clauses in consumer contracts are
unenforceable to the ektent that they purport to preclude a plaintiff's access to the court system.
See Pavlovid, supra note 10, at 392-93 ("In Canada, arbitration clauses have attracted a
significant amount of litigation and academic criticism. In response, Alberta, Ontario, Quebec,
and Saskatchewan have enacted consumer protection legislation regulating pre-dispute
mandatory arbitration clauses.").
